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"This chapter offers some preliminary thoughts about the general concept of social pathology and its usefulness for social philosophy. The first section distinguishes five conceptions of social illness that differ from the one I endorse in this book. Following that I discuss various advantages and disadvantages of the concept of social pathology. Finally, analyzing a little-known example of Rousseau's I illustrate various possible features of a sick society that help to illustrate how that concept aids us in understanding and evaluating social reality"--

AbstractThis paper examines the kind of genealogical project Rousseau undertakes in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality. It explains what it is for Rousseau to discover the "origins" of inequality and examines the normative implications of such an account, especially the relation his genealogical claims have to his critique of society. After arguing that the Discourse singles out l'amour propre as the psychological source of inequality, the paper reconstructs Rousseau's account of the origin of inequality and its criteria for judging the legitimacy of inequalities. It also highlights similarities among Rousseau's use of genealogy and later genealogical projects, such as Nietzsche's.

Using resources from the Second Discourse and the Discourse on Political Economy, this paper reconstructs various conceptions of social pathology implicit in Rousseau's work. It argues that good sense can be made of the idea of a social pathology without relying on unduly medical or organic conceptions of society. Special attention is devoted to explaining Rousseau's picture of a "feverish" society, as grounded in "inflamed" forms of amour-propre. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
This paper sets out the kind of intellectual enterprise Hegel's science of society is by explaining its aim (reconciliation) and the method it employs to achieve that aim. It argues that Hegel's science of society, similar to Smith's and Marx's, offers an account of the good social order that is grounded in both an empirical understanding of existing institutions and a normative commitment to a certain vision of the good life. It spells out the criteria Hegel appeals to in his judgment that the modern social order is fundamentally good and worthy of affirmation, namely, that its three principal institutions−the family, civil society, and the constitutional state−form a coherent and harmonious whole that promotes the basic interests of all its members in a way that also realizes freedom in all three of the senses relevant to social theory: personal, moral, and social freedom.